Guests from the past: What awaits Austria with a party founded by ex-Nazis in power

RU

It was with apparent reluctance that Austrian Federal President Alexander Van der Bellen met on Jan. 6 with Herbert Kickl, the leader of the victorious Freedom Party and instructed him to form a government. Before the meeting, the other parties that had made it into parliament failed to agree on an alternative ruling coalition — one that would exclude the far-right, which took the top spot in September’s elections.

As a result, for the first time since World War II, the formation of a government was entrusted to a party whose political pedigree traces back directly to the 1938 Nazi Anschluss of Austria. Its leader, Herbert Kickl, follows Adolf Hitler's example, calling himself the “people's chancellor,” and does not conceal his radical political views, which are poorly aligned with European values.

Why the ultra-right is strong in Austria

The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) is not new to power. Founded in 1956 by Anton Reinthaller, a former SS officer and member of the Austrian leadership during the Third Reich, the FPÖ has been actively involved in Austrian politics and has even played a role in ruling coalitions, first entering the government in the early 1980s during a brief liberal turn in the party.

However, even after the right-wing radicals returned to the helm, the FPÖ retained its appeal to many Austrians. The year 1999 saw another breakthrough. Headed by Jörg Haider, the governor of Carinthia and an open nationalist, the FPÖ received 26.91% of the vote, good enough for second place in the national standings (behind the Social Democrats, and ahead of the center-right by only 415 votes).

The Social Democrats sought to team up with the center-right to create a stable government with an absolute majority in parliament, but Wolfgang Schüssel, leader of the center-right Austrian People's Party, rejected the left's offer. In doing so, he created the necessary conditions for the Social Democrats to form a coalition with the FPÖ, as they could not create a stable government on their own. The negotiations earned Schüssel the post of chancellor in a far-right government. The FPÖ’s reputation prevented any of its members from assuming key leadership positions, but when Schüssel's coalition government was sworn in on Feb. 4, 2000, eight of the 19 ministerial portfolios were given to representatives of Haider’s party.

The forces that elevated the FPÖ back then are similar to the factors at play today. The first reason is a migration boom. While relevant for the whole of Europe, it was in Austria that the trend first led to a new configuration of power. By the late 1990s, 9% of Austria's population were non-citizens, of whom 87% were from non-EU member states. At the time, this was the highest proportion of non-EU residents in the entire bloc.

As we now see in other EU countries, the migration boom is generating an electoral demand for a more conservative migration policy. This trend is coupled with a crisis of traditional parties — many voters no longer see any major difference between politicians of the center-left and center-right, a view that had boosted the popularity of right-wing populist movements.

Additionally, Austria features a peculiar political culture in which no ban on right-wing discourse — whether formal or informal — exists. Unlike post-war Germany, Austria did not go through a phase of “repentance.” Moreover, Austrian society by default considers its country a victim, rather than a perpetrator, of World War II. As a result, FPÖ was able to enter the national political landscape quite smoothly, right after the restoration of national statehood in 1955, and then performed well in elections under anti-communist and nationalist slogans.

The party's existence did not cease even when Simon Wiesenthal, a well-known hunter of Nazi criminals, exposed the FPÖ’s then-leader, Friedrich Peter, as a former SS officer. During the war, Peter served as an Obersturmführer in the 10th Infantry Regiment of the 1st SS Infantry Brigade, which was part of the Einsatzgruppen — units directly engaged in the extermination of so-called “inferior peoples.” Peter's only argument in his defense was that he had not been a member of the punitive units and did not take part in the massacres.

Then-Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, who himself had Jewish roots, opposed the persecution of former Nazis and said that Wiesenthal was “making a living telling the world that Austria is anti-Semitic.” Friedrich Peter was not forced to resign as party leader until three years later.

Riding the migration wave

As a junior partner in the Schüssel government in the early 2000s, FPÖ did not make any considerable progress on the anti-immigration front. All they could do was partially implement two of their demands: introduce compulsory German language learning as a condition for the renewal of residence permits, and establish a three-year transition period before opening up the Austrian labor market to migrants from Central and Eastern European countries that had recently become EU members.

At that time the party was only a junior coalition partner and, therefore, could not expect to incorporate all of its programmatic demands into the coalition’s political program. But what about today?

FPÖ's recent success has been attributed to a surge in the share of Austrians with a migrant background: from 21.4% in 2015 to 27.2% in 2024. The majority of new arrivals hail from Syria, Romania, and Ukraine, followed by citizens of Germany and Hungary. 40% of Austrian-born residents rate coexistence with migrants as “quite bad” or “very bad,” and attitudes towards migrants among the country's indigenous population are steadily worsening: in 2022, a quarter of respondents chose one of those options; in 2023, it was already a third.

This sentiment correlates with the growing popularity of FPÖ. After the party earned 26.98% in 1999, an intra-party split brought its share down to 10.01% in the snap elections of 2002. However, in the four most recent parliamentary campaigns, the party took home an average of 23%, with its best-ever result — 28.8% — coming in 2024.

FPÖ’s support has been even higher in recent state and presidential elections. In the latest state elections, the party received 41.6% in Vienna and 46.4% in the state of Burgenland. In the 2016 presidential election, FPÖ candidate Norbert Hofer reached the second round, where he took 46.21%.

Finally, at the end of the latest election, when the Socialists failed to reach an agreement with Austria's center-right People's Party, the roles reversed. FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl has now been given a mandate to form a government, while conservatives from the People's Party are destined to be a junior coalition partner. Coalition talks are said to be nearing completion.

Back to the future

Like most European right-wing populists, FPÖ members are Euroskeptics, and the party’s criticisms of specific EU practices that it presents as being poorly aligned with Austria's interests were the focus of its election program. Austrian populists proclaim the slogan “Europe of the peoples” and advocate transferring several EU mandates back to Austria, halving European institutions (primarily the European Parliament), and cutting the European budget.

Nevertheless, FPÖ does not directly oppose European integration. On the contrary, its main mouthpieces emphasize the need to return to “the original and long-forgotten idea of the EU — peace, freedom and prosperity.” The party's election manifesto declares that relations between European institutions and member states should be based not only on solidarity (a principle declared by Brussels to this day) but also on federation (which remains a strategic goal of the EU but in practice has come to be considered obsolete). Essentially, FPÖ proposes a rollback of European integration to the level of the 1970s: a return to indirect elections to the European Parliament, which existed before 1979, and prioritization of national legislation over European law. The Austrian far-right declared these objectives on the eve of the elections and found that many voters support them.

The party is also strongly opposed to the EU migration pact, which envisages the possibility of directive redistribution of refugees between countries. FPÖ leaders propose a choice: either the EU adopts a “European Fortress” policy of stricter border controls and a broader legal framework for expelling refugees (or preventing their entry to the EU), or else Austria must regain the ability to deal with migration at the national level.

What the far right wants

Under the coalition government program that is taking shape, the FPÖ and the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) have already agreed to halve social benefits for migrants and to impose a federal ban on headpieces that cover the face of female civil servants (so far, only the state of Styria has a ban to this effect).

Left-wing observers are alarmed: the declared course on strengthening public security implies greater control over both migrant organizations and civil society in general — and may call into question the right to form associations and hold public meetings, which are crucial freedoms for Austria's left.

FPÖ has also gained significant electoral points by criticizing the EU's green transition. European anti-carbon policies, as well as regulations to restore the natural environment, are costing member states dearly, and FPÖ leaders have openly declared their intention to withdraw support for the Green Deal, which Kickl calls “climate communism.” This component makes his program similar to Donald Trump's, who signed an executive order withdrawing the US from the Paris Climate Agreement in the first days of his second presidency (in his first term, he waited until June to take this step).

In foreign policy, the core thesis of the FPÖ program involves a sharp rejection of the European sanctions policy against Russia. Formally, the party justifies this position using arguments about the negative impact of sanctions on the Austrian economy. Appealing to the tradition of Austrian neutrality, FPÖ insists on reducing European support for Ukraine in the interest of supposedly ending the Russian-Ukrainian war as quickly as possible — regardless of what that means for Ukraine.

In 2016, FPÖ signed a cooperation agreement with Russia's ruling party, United Russia, but later terminated it.

Expectations vs. reality

Is a government coalition between the populists and the Austrian People's Party possible? Right now, it appears to be. The parties have been actively discussing the coalition agenda, and top ÖVP officials have made multiple positive statements about the negotiations, confirming their readiness to join the coalition. Christian Stocker, the new ÖVP leader who came to power after negotiations with the Social Democrats failed, even publicly welcomed the federal president's decision to entrust the formation of a government to Kickl, saying he could well envision a “blue-and-black” coalition.

This would by no means be the first far-right-led government in modern Europe. The most obvious examples can be found in Italy and the Netherlands, and the lesser-known but no less radical Swiss People's Party also occasionally finds itself at the helm in Bern.

None of these countries has collapsed: the far-right parties are prevented from realizing a significant part of their radical election agenda thanks to the fact that they do not enjoy an absolute majority anywhere, and also because the political and legal systems of the European Union limit their scope of potential action.

Supranational competence extends to a large part of the mechanisms that right-wing populists would like to reform, making change almost impossible without consensus among other EU countries. This is precisely why FPÖ seeks to return migration and environmental policies to exclusive national control.

As a result, the most viable FPÖ projects are likely those whose implementation does not require reforming European institutional and legal systems or bloc-wide communitarian policies. In particular, the coalition government will probably succeed in tightening national legislation on public dress code (restrictions on wearing Muslim headwear), control over the activities of non-governmental organizations, and regulations regarding public events. This would be a path that Hungary has long followed, and which a few other Central and Eastern European members of the Union are trying to follow. From Brussels' point of view, Hungary violates the regime of fundamental EU rights — but the country remains a member state, despite constant reproaches against it.

Election promises related to pan-European institutions and practices will be much more difficult to fulfill. For one, the FPÖ leaders' ambitions to change the structure and election principle of the European Parliament look implausible. The principles are enshrined in the basic EU treaties and are subject to amendment only by consensus at ad hoc intergovernmental conferences, which can only be convened at the initiative of European institutions or through the will of a majority of EU member states. In Austria's case, it is clear that these conditions will not be met anytime in the foreseeable future.

One would also be hard-pressed to imagine Austria unilaterally withdrawing from the migration pact or the Green Deal. In theory, such steps are not impossible: the EU legal system allows for the possibility of multi-speed integration and, consequently, non-participation of an individual member state in a certain pillar of integration policy. However, once an EU member has entered into an integration project, it is legally and politically difficult to withdraw from it.

The EU's areas of shared competence are governed, inter alia, by regulations (i.e. general rules prioritized over national legislation) and directives (general rules involving incorporation into national law, taking into account national specificities). From this perspective, the Kickl government will have to choose from three options: to declare Austria’s withdrawal from relevant EU projects, to try to slow down or minimize the effect of the relevant European project for Austria by diluting its essence at the national level, or to create a coalition of countries in the EU Council — with Hungary, possibly Slovakia, and perhaps even the Czech Republic if there is a change of government in Prague at the beginning of 2026 — in order to reform or abolish a specific European project.

None of these options looks particularly promising at the moment, especially as the government will include People's Party representatives more loyal to the Green Deal. However, there is always the option of imitating the process: Freedom Party representatives will keep up their tough rhetoric in order to maintain their image as defenders of Austria's national interests in the eyes of the electorate, but the final result (or rather, its absence) will be explained by interference from political rivals and Brussels-based Eurocrats.

A palliative remedy, demonstrating the apparent radicalism of the populists, could be to tighten controls on Austria's intra-European borders — as Germany has done. Schengen rules allow for the temporary reinstatement of national controls at the internal borders of Schengen states. Doing so doesn't make much sense, but many law-abiding citizens who have their passports checked will interpret such a procedure as the act of a strong government that cares about national security.

Russia lovers club

As for Ukraine, Kickl's government, like Viktor Orban's in Hungary, cannot unilaterally lift sanctions against Russia or change its position on the Russian-Ukrainian war. True, Kickl can bargain, but he is unlikely to veto the extension of sanctions, as the revision of strategic decisions in the EU requires the consensus of all executive structures at the level of the main institutions: the European Council, the EU Council, and diplomats from the European Commission. So far, experts have not considered such a scenario.

That said, much here will depend on Donald Trump and his foreign policy. The figuratively “pro-Russian” EU member states — Hungary, Slovakia, Austria under the FPÖ government, and possibly the Czech Republic if former Prime Minister Babiš, whose party is already cooperating with Viktor Orbán at the European Parliament level, returns to power — will keep a close eye on the Trump administration's actions. If Washington's peacemaking attempts are successful, the countries could become a battering ram employed by Trump’s America and Putin’s Russia in an effort to break up the EU sanctions regime.

Due to one constraint or another, the Freedom Party of Austria is unlikely to realize many of its election promises — if it in fact implements any of them at all. Unlike Donald Trump, likely future Austrian federal chancellor Herbert Kickl has neither the full power of an American president nor a full majority in parliament. A move towards a tougher migration policy or a crackdown on civil society institutions is inevitable under FPÖ rule, but in just about every other regard, far-right voters are more likely to be disappointed than satisfied with the government they brought into power.